Hollosi Information eXchange /HIX/
Copyright (C) HIX
Új cikk beküldése (a cikk tartalma az író felelőssége)
Megrendelés Lemondás
1 WHO are the Jugos? (mind)  7 sor     (cikkei)
2 European newsgroups (mind)  5 sor     (cikkei)
3 A Reply to the IHR/Zundel s "66 Q&A" (mind)  93 sor     (cikkei)
4 National Review on "Yalta II" (mind)  100 sor     (cikkei)
5 BABY SITTER NEEDED IN USA (mind)  1 sor     (cikkei)
6 The score /Ajax vs.Ferencvaros/ (mind)  6 sor     (cikkei)

+ - WHO are the Jugos? (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

i hear all this stuff of baznia from glenn, dole, klinton et al but remain 
very confused of how 700+yrs of quibble betwixt horvaths and serbs involves 
hungarians at all! Some 30yrs ago, 20K GIs would have been appropriate, but 
now it seems that m.o. is a temporary Amtrak/Greyhound depot for important 
things... btw: who are them Jugo's anyway?

u.i.: in 1975 the Yugo was voted as the "Car of the year"
+ - European newsgroups (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Does anyone out there have a comprehensive list of newsgroups in Europe. 
 I am interested in the soc.culture and student type newsgroups.
  Much apreciated
+ - A Reply to the IHR/Zundel s "66 Q&A" (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

[Followups to alt.revisionism]

The Nizkor Project announces the addition of 

"A Reply to the IHR/Zundel's '66 Q&A'," 

http://www.almanac.bc.ca/features/qar to The Nizkor Web ...and now 
the details:

                         The Pamphlet

The Institute for Historical Review, or IHR, publishes pamphlets 
designed to misinform people about the Holocaust.  One of the 
most persistent has been a pamphlet called "66 Questions And Answers 
About the Holocaust", or simply "66 Q&A."

This pamphlet neatly summarizes many of the most common arguments used
by Holocaust-deniers. Refuting these 66 claims strikes directly at the 
core of Holocaust-denial.

Readers of the Usenet newsgroup alt.revisionism will notice claims 
and arguments below which may seem familiar.  This is because this 
material, and its derivatives, have been presented and discussed on 
Usenet many times before.  These web pages contain more in-depth 
replies than previous postings, however, and the links to other 
information put the technology of the web to good use.

The pamphlet itself has been put up on the world-wide web by at least
two separate Holocaust-deniers, Greg Raven, of the IHR, and Ernst 
Zundel, described by Canada's Security Intelligence Review Committee 
as "a Holocaust denier and prolific publisher of hate literature," and 
the sponsor and promoter of a 1991 neo-Nazi conference in Germany.

The Nizkor Project now offers a point-by-point refutation the 
half-truths and untruths of the "66 Questions & Answers." The full text 
of the original pamphlet is included, with the IHR's questions and 
answers reproduced unaltered, but if you would like to see their 
material for yourself, you may examine them by visiting URL

http://www.almanac.bc.ca/features/qar/  and utilizing the full
range of links provided.

If our treatment seems tedious, consider yourself lucky: years ago, the 
IHR used to publish _one hundred and twenty_ Questions! We have been 
unable to obtain a copy of that older pamphlet, so for now we resign 
ourselves to critiquing the abridged version. Remember as you're 
reading this version that there were 54 other "questions and 
answers" that were not good enough to make the final cut!
Perhaps, with further effort, we may one day see the number
reduced once again.

Finally, for another good antidote to the 66 Q&A, look at the 36 Q&A
put out by the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. A link to this 
document is available from our Q&A page as well.

           The Refusal to Cross-Link the Pamphlet

Nizkor believes that truth has no need for secrecy. We present the
material of the Holocaust-deniers unaltered and openly, with
links back to their web sites so that they may respond. However, 
Greg Raven does not feel that this is important: he refuses to link his
66 Q&A pages to our response.

Ernst Zundel may or may not choose to cross-link;  we'll have to
wait and see.  Nizkor has spent a great deal of effort trying to
convince him that cross-linking is worthwhile, and he has spent a great
deal of effort giving reasons why he would prefer not to participate. 
He has not really committed himself to it one way or the other, yet. (You
may read about our efforts to obtain Mr. Zundel's cooperation
in this matter via the URL's provided on our site.)

Greg Raven, though asked many times to establish links between 
our sites, has responded to us only once, saying that it would 
be "illogical" to cross-link to every site that links to him.  Note 
that he apparently thinks it is logical to link his home page to other 
Holocaust-denial sites like Zundel's and Bradley Smith's. (Mr. Raven's 
Vulcan routine is, apparently, quite selective.)

Speaking of Bradley Smith, since he is the head of the Committee
for Open Debate on the Holocaust, we would hope that he would assist 
us in our efforts to "debate" these issues, by encouraging Mr. Raven 
and Mr. Zundel to cross-link their 66 Q&A pages to our response. His
goals and ours happen to coincide in this case -- "open debate"
-- so we look forward to his help.

     The Nizkor Project: An Electronic Holocaust Educational Resource
                   Anonymous ftp: ftp.almanac.bc.ca
Nizkor Web: http://www.almanac.bc.ca/ (Under construction - permanently!)
   Kenneth McVay OBC.  Home Page: http://www.almanac.bc.ca/~kmcvay/
+ - National Review on "Yalta II" (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Yalta in the Balkans, by Peter Rodman, National Review, Nov. 25, 1995 Mr.
Rodman, an NR senior editor, is Director of National Security Programs at
the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom (and highly-regarded foreign policy
expert having served in the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush

One of the better arguments for the Dayton Accords and the dispatching of
U.S. troops to Bosnia was that putting the Bosnia conflict on ice would
serve larger American strategic interests. One such interest was the
future of the Western Alliance: the prolongation of the Bosnia war and the
squabbles among the Allies were poisonous to the Alliance itself, and the
resulting incoherence of Western policy was poisonous to NATO's
credibility. A second key strategic interest was the enlargement of NATO
into Central Europe, and prolongation of the Bosnia war was also
complicating this. (During the climactic NATO bombing operations in
September, Boris Yeltsin gave a tempestuous news conference in which he
conflated the two issues, blustering that an enlarged NATO would soon be
dropping bombs on Russia's doorstep.) The Dayton Accords offered us a
chance, in other words, to put all these complications behind us and to
refocus our European policy on our larger concerns. 

These arguments for Dayton still hold, but NATIONAL REVIEW has learned of
a stunningly duplicitous turn in the Clinton Administration's policy
toward Russia, Bosnia, and the Atlantic Alliance: The President and his
associates are reported to have given Moscow secret assurances that, in
return for its cooperation with the United States in Bosnia peacekeeping,
NATO enlargement will be put ?on the back burner? for the foreseeable
future. The rationale was that, given this demonstration of Russia's
readiness to be a partner in a new cooperative ?European security
architecture," the extension of NATO security guarantees to Central Europe
would not be a priority any time soon. This account comes from official
and authoritative sources, both Russian and American. 
It has long been understood (indeed, admitted by some Administration
officials) that concrete decisions on admitting new NATO members would be
put off until after the Russian elections, especially the presidential
election scheduled for June 1996?which meant, as a practical matter, until
after the US presidential election as well. Russian officials interpret
the new assurances to mean that if Mr. Clinton is re-elected, nothing will
happen on NATO enlargement in his second term either. 
The story is accompanied by reports of other assurances to the Russians
that their cooperation on Bosnia would put the United States in their debt
and earn them greater American understanding on other issues, such as
their reassertion of control in their ?near abroad" (Central Asia and the
Caucasus, including the oil-rich Caspian basin). 
As usual, this Administration has its strategic priorities totally
bass-ackwards. It is wrong to pay a price to Russia over Bosnia in the
strategic coin of our larger interest in consolidating security in Central
Europe.  It is wrong to sacrifice NATO enlargement to the Russians over
Bosnia or over anything else. The Administration's repeated assurances to
Congress and to the Allies that Russia would not have a veto over NATO
enlargement turn out to be empty?perhaps just another of the
"terminological inexactitudes" that have become so familiar. A huge price
will ultimately be paid for this. 

There is no current threat to Central Europe. The newly liberated states
of the region, however, have just recently awakened from a sixty-year
nightmare, still find themselves situated between Germany and Russia, and
know in their bones that their survival is not guaranteed by history. They
consider themselves part of the West culturally, politically, and morally;
they therefore seek Western assurances that we feel we have a stake in
their security and independence.  Seen in this light, NATO enlargement is
not a new act, but a consolidation of the post-1989 status quo: these are
free, sovereign countries exercising their free, sovereign choice to
associate with us. Either Russia accepts this, or it does not. 

Leaving the security status of Central Europe ambiguous only leaves open
temptations to Russian irredentists. NATO membership for Central Europe is
among other things a way of telling the Russians that their acceptance of
the post-1989 status quo in Central Europe is the sine qua non of any
relationship with us. If the Russians have a problem with this?which they
clearly seem to have?then we are all facing a major problem five or ten
years down the road a as Russia regains its strength. 

The Administration's rationale for delaying NATO enlargement has been
twofold. One is the claim that it will be easier to achieve such
enlargement if we go about it gradually. But the nationalist turn in
Russian politics, expected to be given new impetus by the December
elections for the Duma, tells us that it will NOT get any easier. Russia
is only getting stronger and more assertive; every month, the risks and
inhibitions on our side will only grow. The Administration's second
rationale (at least, so I suspect) is what philosophy majors will remember
as Zeno's paradox: the idea that if you divide a distance into an infinite
number of tiny increments, you never get to the destination. This may be
the Administration's real calculation. In other words, it just does not
want to enlarge NATO?for fear of antagonizing Moscow. The first rationale
is bad judgment; the second is bad faith. 

Whatever the short-term plaudits due to the Administration for putting the
Bosnia conflict on ice, in Central Europe we are seeing a strategic
blunder of historic proportions. 

WWW                : http://www.glue.umd.edu/~kovacs
personal email     : 
+ - BABY SITTER NEEDED IN USA (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

+ - The score /Ajax vs.Ferencvaros/ (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

In article >, Kertesz Tom 
.lockheed.com> writes:
> What was the score?
> Ajax-Ferencvaros 4-O /2-O/