RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
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RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol 2, No. 185, 24 September 1998

HUNGARIAN SENIOR SECURITY OFFICER DISMISSED. Laszlo Kover,
secret services minister without portfolio, dismissed General
Jozsef Vajda as deputy director-general of the National
Security Office on 23 September. The private television
station TV2 reported that Vajda was a board member of a
security technology firm that deals with private
investigations. "Magyar Hirlap" cited secret service circles
as denying that his dismissal is connected with the ongoing
scandal over the illegal surveillance of Federation of Young
Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party leaders. MSZ

ROMANIAN COALITION DEPUTIES PROPOSE AMENDMENT TO EDUCATION
LAW. Deputies representing coalition parties on the Chamber
of Deputies' Education Commission have asked the commission
to amend the recently approved article on higher education
included in the regulation that changes the education law.
That article forbids the setting up of universities teaching
in languages of the national minorities. The deputies want
the legislation amended to make possible setting up such
universities by special law, thus meeting the demands of the
Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (UDMR) The
commission's chairman, Greater Romania Party deputy Anghel
Stanciu, said the proposed amendment reflects "surrender to
UDMR blackmail," RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau reported. MS


SLOVAKIA'S RETURN TO EUROPE?

By Christopher Walker

	Despite Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's recent
claim that "talk in Europe about Slovakia's lack of democracy
will definitely come to an end" after the upcoming elections,
there is serious doubt whether Slovakia will be able to
overcome its poor image in the longer term should Meciar's
ruling Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) retain
power. Such a result could arguably result in Slovakia's
losing a full decade in its effort to join NATO and the EU.
On the other hand, if the assembled opposition parties manage
to pull together an electoral victory, Slovakia will have the
chance to restore its credibility rather quickly and realign
itself with the West.
	Thus, in a fundamental way, the choice Slovaks make in
these elections will determine if their country identifies
with the West and is prepared to take part in its
institutional structures or if it continues to orient itself
toward less developed, slower reforming post-Soviet states to
the East.
	Slovakia's dubious image abroad has been shaped
principally by the Meciar regime's parochial, immature, and
often brutal political leadership. This behavior, ranging
from petty political subterfuge to outright thuggery, has
saddled Slovakia with an unfavorable image that in any case
may be hard to shed.
	Remarkably, it was not very long ago that Slovakia was
considered to belong to the same "fast track" group of
applicants for Western integration as Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic. No longer perceived as a member of the
original "Visegrad" group, Slovakia now runs the risk of
slipping still farther. This time, however, the stakes are
much higher. The very possibility that Slovakia will become
more closely associated with its Eastern neighbors has
significant implications: it may reinforce the belief of the
outside world--as well as Slovaks themselves--that Slovakia's
place is in the East. That belief would effectively freeze
Slovakia's candidacy for admission to the EU and NATO.
	While Slovakia's economy has proven resilient, its
political development has been inconsistent with Western
standards. In fact, as a result of its relative political
immaturity, there is a larger question as to whether Slovakia
can maintain its economic successes in the longer term
without the necessary consolidation of democracy and
international integration.
	It is difficult to gauge precisely the opportunity cost
of the Slovak leadership's preoccupation with internal
rivalries and political intrigue over the past six years. One
may conclude, however, that dawdling during the crucial
initial "courtship" of Western institutions has set back
Slovakia at least several years and has prevented the country
from achieving the necessary degree of political soundness to
advance into key Western clubs. The window for first-round
NATO admission is already closed. The EU sent a strong
message to Bratislava last year when Slovakia--recognized by
the European Commission for its strong economic performance--
was pointedly left off the first-round invitation list as a
result of its underdeveloped democratic institutions.
	One of the most important, broad consequences of NATO
and EU expansion is the salutary effect these institutions
can have on relations among its member states. These clubs
have been instrumental in forging a peaceful post-War
transatlantic order and have contributed greatly to the
prosperity enjoyed by its members. By remaining outside the
positive influence of these institutions, Slovakia loses the
opportunity to improve its own internal development and
establish better working relationships with its neighbors.
	The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary--which are not
only among the first-round candidates for EU admission but
are also the first three to receive invitations to join the
NATO alliance--have broadly demonstrated their commitment to
resolving difficult public-policy questions in a manner
consistent with Western norms. One can already see these
results. Poland is undertaking a number of important
initiatives to improve regional cooperation, including
difficult negotiations with Ukraine on border issues and
steps toward deeper integration with Germany. The newly
elected Hungarian leadership, while using rather heated
rhetoric on minority issues, is not expected to deviate from
acceptable political norms. That is in no small measure due
to Hungary's accepted responsibilities in Western
institutions.
	Slovakia's choice in the elections is of regional
concern. The Czechs, for instance, face the prospect of
having their Moravian frontier form a portion of the new
East-West divide. For Poland and Hungary--not to mention
Austria--an unanchored and unpredictable Slovakia will hinder
the effort to build an integrated regional economic and
security structure.
	Meciar has done a masterful job of dividing the
opposition, but the political stunts and hardball tactics he
has employed to maintain power have had a corrosive effect on
Slovakia's political culture. During the period of HZDS
control--where infighting and cronyism have been the rule,
rather than the exception--there have been few steps taken to
direct the young Slovak state toward political normalcy. On
the contrary, the Meciar period has defined itself by its
reliance on what it regards as foreign and domestic villains,
thus limiting Slovakia's focus on more substantive matters
and preventing the country from engaging in vital self-
examination. That tactic is an integral part of a larger
strategy aimed at blaming domestic deficiencies on foreign
interference.
	Slovaks, through their vote in the elections this week,
can decide for themselves whether Meciar's HZDS is best
suited for advancing Slovakia's real interests and where
exactly they believe Slovakia's proper place is in Europe.

The author is manager of programs at the European Journalism
Network.
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